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A B S T R A C T
Ecosystem-based management of fisheries and other transboundary natural resources require a number of or-
ganizations across jurisdictions to exchange knowledge, coordinate policy goals and engage in collaborative
activities. Trust, as part of social capital, is considered a key mechanism facilitating the coordination of such
inter-organizational policy networks. However, our understanding of multi-dimensional trust as a theoretical
construct and an operational variable in environmental and natural resource management has remained largely
untested. This paper presents an empirical assessment of trust and communication measures applied to the North
American Great Lakes fisheries policy network. Using a scale-based method developed for this purpose, we
quantify the prevalence of different dimensions of trust and in/formal communication in the network and their
differentiated impacts on decision-making and goal consensus. Our analysis reveals that calculation-based ‘ra-
tional trust’ is important for aligning mutual goals, but relationship-based ‘affinitive trust’ is most significant for
influencing decision-making. Informal communication was also found to be a strong predictor of how effectively
formal communication will influence decision-making, confirming the “priming” role of informal interactions in
formal inter-agency dealings. The results also show the buffering and interactive functions of these components
in strengthening institutional resilience, with procedural trust undergirding the system to compensate for a lack
of well-developed relationships. Overall, this study provides evidence to suggest that informal communication
and multi-dimensional trust constitute a crucial element for improving collaboration and reducing conflict in the
networked governance of transboundary natural resource systems.
1. Introduction
Governance of natural resources involves dealing with complex and
emergent properties that necessitate management strategies capable of
learning, anticipating, and adapting to change across scale. In the case
of large-scale, transboundary resource issues such as the multi-party
allocation and pollution of river-, lake- or ocean-based resources, so-
phisticated approaches to mutual coordination and collective action
among diverse stakeholders are often required, including tactfully
managed collaboration through knowledge sharing and the integration
of relevant information into decision-making (Olsson et al., 2008;
Ruckelshaus et al., 2008; Berkes, 2012; Long et al., 2015). However,
governments have had limited sustained success in addressing complex
and transboundary environment and resource challenges, both within
and across their jurisdictional boundaries (Cash and Moser, 2000;
Munton, 2006; Burch, 2010; Harries and Penning-Rowsell, 2011).
Public policy networks have subsequently been developed and utilized
in many natural resource systems based on recognition that the
knowledge needed to inform decision-making is often highly frag-
mented within and across bureaucratic agencies, particularly when
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2018.11.001
Received 9 May 2018; Received in revised form 25 October 2018; Accepted 4 November 2018
⁎ Corresponding author at: ARC Centre of Excellence for Coral Reef Studies, James Cook University, 1 James Cook Drive, Townsville, QLD, 4811, Australia.
E-mail addresses: andrew.song@jcu.edu.au, andrewmsong@gmail.com (A.M. Song).
Global Environmental Change 54 (2019) 6–18
Available online 20 November 2018
0959-3780/ © 2018 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/BY-NC-ND/4.0/).
T
regulatory jurisdiction is shared (Temby and Stoett, 2017). These net-
works generally enable agencies to better share and integrate specia-
lized knowledge and develop institutional capacity in order to address
what Rittel and Webber (1973) refer to as “wicked” problems of
modern governance. Their membership tends to be overlapping among
issue areas, with public agencies typically participating in networks on
a wide range of topics (Isett et al., 2011).
Ecosystem-based management (EBM) is a mode of resource gov-
ernance that embraces the functional need to build, manage, and
maintain inter-organizational networks and improve coordination be-
tween participating entities (Imperial, 1999: 452). Substantial research
has focused on understanding and resolving various organization and
coordination challenges in different EBM network settings (e.g., Bodin
and Crona, 2009; Brondizio et al., 2009; Rosen and Olsson, 2013; van
Meerkerk et al., 2015), with an increasing recognition that trust can
enhance the integrative performance of policy networks (Pretty, 2003;
Agranoff, 2007; Ostrom, 2010; Edelenbos and van Meerkerk, 2015;
Paul et al., 2016). For example, Stern and Baird (2015), noted that
allowing for positive trust diversity (via fostering different types of
trust) can help to support the institutional resilience of policy networks
through functional redundancy. However, despite such recognition, the
conceptualization and operationalization of trust has been variably and
somewhat insufficiently applied in environmental and natural resource
management contexts (see, for example, Davenport et al., 2007; Vaske
et al., 2007; Stern, 2008; Smith et al., 2013; Turner et al., 2016; Song
et al., 2017a). According to Klijn et al. (2010: 194), trust remains,
overall, “a neglected issue in research on governance networks,” despite
playing a potentially significant role in both their function and out-
comes.
The North American Great Lakes fisheries system offers an im-
portant case where EBM has been institutionalized (GLFC (Great Lakes
Fishery Commission), 2007; Minns, 2013; Jackson, 2015) and, cru-
cially, because of the pre-existing history of inter-jurisdictional working
relationships and inter-personal networks, it represents an instrumental
case through which the varied functions of trust and communication
can be analyzed. Initially shaped by the urgent need to address the Sea
Lamprey (Petromyzon marinus) invasion into the Great Lakes Basin in
the middle of the 20th century (Song et al., 2017b), the fisheries of the
Great Lakes have long been governed by multiple entities, including
individuals with different expertise and cultural backgrounds re-
presenting different institutions and jurisdictions, through policy net-
works that have relied on collegial and personal relationships for suc-
cess (Leonard et al., 2011). As a result, a professional epistemic
community has emerged in the Great Lakes fisheries policy network
(Gaden et al., 2013), with networked governance evident in both do-
mestic and transboundary policy and management (Karkkainen, 2006;
Mulvaney et al., 2015). Using this backdrop, the aim of this paper is to
empirically examine the differentiated extent and impact of trust and
informal communication on policy coordination with a view to in-
forming broader efforts to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of
transboundary policy networks. The following section supplies a theo-
retical rationale for the multi-dimensionality of trust and informal
communication, which leads to our research questions. Next, the case
study is described, followed by the methodology, which includes survey
research using a psychometric scale designed to measure different di-
mensions of trust. The remaining sections present the results of our
study followed by a discussion of the implications of our findings for
understanding and improving inter-organizational coordination within
transboundary policy networks.
2. Theoretical background: multi-dimensional trust and informal
communication
Trust is a concept that has been extensively researched in sociology,
psychology, political science, economics and management (for an in-
depth overview of the broader trust literature, see Rousseau et al.,
1998; Nooteboom, 2002; Möllering et al., 2004). A considerable un-
derstanding of its multi-dimensionality (e.g., Lewis and Weigert, 1985;
Khodyakov, 2007), antecedents (e.g., Mayer et al., 1995; McAllister,
1995; Nyhan, 2000) and stages of development (e.g., Zucker, 1986;
Sydow, 1998; Lewicki et al., 2006) has made trust one of the main
concepts utilized in social science research. However, trust has been
less integrated into the study of natural resource and environmental
management – an applied science field, where trust often underpins
coordination, collective action and cooperation mechanisms (Adger,
2003; Ostrom and Ahn, 2003; Vaske et al., 2007). As a result, a more
modest, yet arguably simplistic approach, using uni-dimensional con-
structions of trust has emerged in natural resources and environmental
sciences involving questions such as: “how much trust do you have in X
for doing Y?” Recognizing the limitations of this approach, Stern and
Coleman (2015) identified four types of trust that are generally suited
to the context of analyzing collaborative natural resource management:
1) rational trust, which is based on a calculative assessment of expected
benefits and risks informed by the past history of performance and
predictability; 2) procedural trust, which is about fairness and integrity
of the procedures involved; 3) affinitive trust, which hinges on emotions,
charisma, shared identities or feelings of benevolence developed often,
but not exclusively, from longer-term interactions; and 4) dispositional
trust, a relatively stable personality trait signaling one’s predisposition
to trust another entity. These four types of trust highlight the need to
take a multi-dimensional approach when trying to understand the role
of trust. Despite recent efforts to quantify the role of different dimen-
sions of trust in natural resource management settings (see, for ex-
ample, Klijn et al., 2010; Smith et al., 2013; Temby et al., 2015), the
extent and relative importance of different trust types to transboundary
natural resource policy networks remain unexplored.
Policy networks are also communicative networks, since interaction
among members is one of their defining traits. Yet, different forms of
communication based on varying degrees of formality may have dif-
ferent effects on outcomes. Formal policy networks are “multi-actor
arrangements explicitly constituted by public managers to produce and
deliver public services” (Isett et al., 2011: i162), through mechanisms
such as committee meetings, memos and official verbal or written
communication. Previous studies on formal networks have shown that
formal communication is conducive to well-coordinated outcomes
(Provan and Milward, 1995; Isett and Provan, 2005). Informal com-
munication, which can take place via email and phone calls, sponta-
neous meetings, chance conversations and drinks after work, have
traditionally been understood as being less important policy network
dimensions, yet are increasingly recognized as playing a key role in the
existence of trust among network members (Temby et al., 2017). Ac-
cording to Ring and Van de Ven (1994), trust enables informal under-
standings and commitments to replace more specific reciprocity based
on one’s officially prescribed organizational role. As a result, trust and
informal communication may provide an important bridge between
latent and realized governing capacity by encouraging coordination,
information exchange and learning. However, there is limited empirical
evidence available on the relationships between formal and informal
communication, different trust types and coordination outcomes in
transboundary policy networks, particularly in the context of environ-
mental and natural resource management. Building on a set of nascent
studies undertaken to explore how inter-organizational/agency colla-
boration is shaped and enhanced by trust dimensions and informal
communication (e.g., Temby et al., 2017; Coleman and Stern, 2018),
this paper seeks to address this knowledge gap by addressing the
following questions: 1) Which dimensions of trust (independent vari-
ables) are more important or dominant than others in influencing co-
ordinated decision-making and goal-consensus (dependent variables) in
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a transboundary policy network? and 2) To what extent does informal
communication (independent variable) affect coordination (dependent
variable)?
3. Case study: North American Great Lakes fisheries
The Great Lakes fishery has long suffered from depletion, extinction
and substitution of native species brought by land-based pollution,
overfishing, as well as the introduction of non-native species
(McCrimmon, 2002; Hudson and Ziegler, 2014). The main target spe-
cies in the region have included Yellow Perch, White Perch, Rainbow
Smelt, Walleye, Cisco, Lake Whitefish, Lake Trout and chubs. Com-
mercial fishing, which is now dominated by Yellow Perch, has been
generally declining, while recreational fishing has grown to become an
economically significant industry, with its annual net value estimated
to be as high as 1.47 billion USD (Poe et al., 2013; Hudson and Ziegler,
2014). Since the 1960s, aboriginal fisheries have also been an im-
portant policy actor as their fishing rights have become reaffirmed
through a series of landmark court decisions in both Canada and the
United States (Brenden et al., 2013; Lowitt et al., 2018).
Forming a transboundary basin, four of the five Great Lakes are
bisected by the international border (Lakes Superior, Huron, Erie and
Ontario, with Lake Michigan entirely within the United States). In ad-
dition to the oversight of federal fisheries agencies, within each lake,
there are state and provincial governments, along with inter-tribal or-
ganizations in some cases, who apply management authority in their
apportioned waters through establishing and enforcing harvest reg-
ulations, issuing fishing licenses, stocking fish, and implementing ha-
bitat restoration plans (Gaden et al., 2013). Overall, the Great Lakes are
a complex mosaic of over 650 jurisdictional units encompassing all
scales from municipal to supra-national (McCrimmon, 2002). Addres-
sing many issues facing the fishery in the basin requires an EBM ap-
proach predicated on inter-organizational, inter-jurisdictional co-
ordination and collaboration. For instance, the policy response to the
Sea Lamprey invasion that decimated the Lake Trout fishery by the late
1940s exemplifies a case of successful transboundary coordination,
which also saw the formation of an influential binational organization,
the Great Lakes Fishery Commission [GLFC] in 1954 (Gaden et al.,
2013). Similarly, water quality is approached as a regionally integrated
issue through the cross-border negotiations of the 1972 Great Lakes
Water Quality Agreement (most recently amended in 2012) (Grover
and Krantzberg, 2015). Such examples have contributed to the Great
Lakes becoming a model site of EBM (Gaden et al., 2008; Minns, 2013;
Grover and Krantzberg, 2015). As several recent studies have also
identified (e.g., Leonard et al., 2011; Kalafatis et al., 2015; Mulvaney
et al., 2015; Song et al., 2016), the Great Lakes system has become a
popular and fitting “living laboratory” for studying how inter-organi-
zational networks can address complex environment and natural re-
source-related issues, including fisheries.
4. Methodology
4.1. Scale approach to measuring networked trust
We employed a scale approach to measure trust in the Great Lakes
fisheries policy network using survey research (see Rotter, 1967;
Cummings and Bromiley, 1996; Song et al., 2017a). Trust was con-
sidered a latent construct, represented by Likert-scale type items that
formed measurable (i.e., observed) variables. Once the psychometric
properties of the scale were validated (see Furr, 2011), survey responses
served as a proxy representation of quantified trust, which could then
be used for comparison among groups and subjected to further analyses
to test its effects on dependent variables. Despite the many variations in
the trust scales that have been developed (e.g., Dietz and Den Hartog,
2006; Lewicki et al., 2006; Seppänen et al., 2007; Möllering et al., 2004;
McEvily and Tortoriello, 2011), there has been surprisingly little
repeat-use of the same instrument. Diverse theoretical assumptions
associated with multi-disciplinary interests in trust have led to varying
operational interpretations and outlooks. Trust is also context-depen-
dent, which only becomes meaningful when the specific characteristics
of trustors and trustees are explicitly stated and accounted for
(Rousseau et al., 1998; Kramer, 1999; Hardin, 2002). It follows that
trust measurement is typically too idiosyncratic to enable general-
izations to other contexts beyond which it was developed (Lewicki
et al., 2006; Möllering et al., 2004; Seppänen et al., 2007; McEvily and
Tortoriello, 2011).
Our approach to measuring and analyzing trust using a scale ap-
proach is novel in at least two aspects (see Temby et al., 2015, 2017;
Song et al., 2017a,b for more details on scale construction and past
applications). First, it focuses on the network context, meaning that the
scale is concerned with assessing not only the specific trust relations
between pairs of entities, but also seeing how these paired relations
would connect with each other to form an overall distributed pattern.
Existing trust scales have generally been limited to measuring one-to-
one dyadic trust (see, for example, Rempel et al., 1985; McAllister,
1995; Cummings and Bromiley, 1996; Nyhan and Marlowe, 1997;
Nyhan, 2000; Lambright et al., 2010) which results in a narrower, more
focused relation (e.g., between a resource user and a government of-
ficer, between a practitioner and a professional network as a whole, or
between a community group and the government). Subsequently, these
scales are not designed to target a large number of actor groups oper-
ating within a transboundary policy network. Second, our scale in-
corporates the multi-dimensionality of trust (as recommended by Lewis
and Weigert, 1985; McEvily and Tortoriello, 2011) in order to differ-
entiate between types of trust and their varying impacts on coordina-
tion and collaboration, going beyond the more simplistic uni-dimen-
sional representations of trust or directly questioning “whether one
trusts another”.
4.2. Inter-agency trust scale and survey design
Our inter-agency trust scale was originally adapted from
Nooteboom et al.’s (1997) survey, intended for measuring inter-firm
trust in private sector alliances and validated for use in public policy
networks (see Song et al., 2017a,b for full details). We further oper-
ationalized the typology of Stern and Coleman (2015), as well as other
relevant work, to account for the four trust dimensions (affinitive,
procedural, rational and dispositional) (see Table 1). Applying it to the
public sector, we first identified a list of relevant public agencies that
formed the broadly-defined Great Lakes fisheries policy network, i.e.,
those with a role in the management and science of the fisheries, di-
rectly or indirectly. Totalling 45, they included binational organizations
such as the International Joint Commission and the Great Lakes Fishery
Commission, tribal organizations such as the Great Lakes Indian Fish
and Wildlife Commission, federal agencies such as Fisheries and Oceans
Canada, Natural Resources Canada, the U.S. Geological Survey and the
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, and sub-national entities at the pro-
vince/state level including the Ontario Ministry of Environment and
Climate Change and the Michigan Department of Natural Resources
(see Supplementary material Table S.1 for a full agency list). The survey
begins by asking respondents to select an agency to which s/he belongs
from the list and then asking to select all the agencies that they com-
municate with formally and informally in their professional role. This
communicative history forms an essential basis for establishing a
“working relationship,” however banal or sporadic. The respondents
were then prompted to complete the trust-related questions (i.e., trust
scale items) for all the relationships they specified in the previous step.
Because a respondent is answering the questions for the several agen-
cies listed in the survey, the survey generates information on one-to-
many trust relations. By collating all responses, this survey design
permits capturing the shape and extent of trust distributions across a
group of organizations, in addition to being able to separate the level of
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trust for each dyadic relationship (see Supplementary material Table
S.2 for all survey questions).
The trust scale used in this study consisted of nine items designed to
operationalize affinitive, procedural and rational trust. As shown in
Table 1, items ATrust1, 2 and 3 together represent affinitive trust by
eliciting the informal and characteristic-based aspects of relationships
such as familiarity and shared experiences. These items deliberately
focus on longer-term interactions as a basis of affinitive trust. This is
due to our focus on inter-agency collaboration in the public sector,
where professional interactions tend to begin through formal processes,
following bureaucratic lines of hierarchy and accountability. Shorter-
term and inter-personal intuitions that can hinge on charisma, likability
or impressionistic assumptions of similar values/identity were therefore
not included in our measures of affinitive trust in this study. Items
PTrust4, 5 and 6 characterize procedural trust, as they pertain to process-
based notions such as integrity, fairness and perception of equity and
justice. For rational trust, we hypothesized that Items RTrust7, 8 and 9
would comprise the “instrumental” dimension of trust based on calcu-
lated risks and expectations of performance and utility. Dispositional
trust was operationalized as a personality trait rather than a relational
attribute, with the three items therefore separated from the scale
questions in the survey. All items were measured on a five-point Likert
scale (i.e., strongly agree to strongly disagree). As a final step, the
survey solicited qualitative information in the form of an open-ended
question asking respondents’ additional observations, insights and
opinions on the topic.
4.3. Data collection
The survey was conducted using an open-source online tool
(Limesurvey) between October and November 2015. The survey
broadly targeted civil servants working on fish and fisheries-related
issues in the Great Lakes who were formally affiliated with binational
organizations, federal or state/provincial government agencies in
Canada and the United States. The names and email addresses of key
individuals within these organizations were identified from publicly
accessible government reports and online documentation. We paid
special attention to their professional titles, whenever such information
was available, in order to increase the potential relevance of the survey
to those solicited for participation. For instance, middle-level managers
or researchers were typically selected over administrative staff or junior
lab technicians for the former’s presumed greater networking impetus
in their prescribed role. This involved a largely intuitive and manual
inspection process. Potential respondents were then contacted via email
to introduce the study and were provided with the online survey in-
strument’s web-based URL. In total, 2086 email addresses were com-
piled to form a non-randomized convenience sample, resulting in 226
completed surveys. Because defining a governance network by identi-
fying all relevant civil servants was less than perfect (in fact, estimating
the contours and the density of a network is typically one of the major
aims of network analysis, including this study), and also because the
completion of the survey relied on respondents’ voluntary participation,
the survey was designed without pre-set quotas or strata of respondents.
All responses were anonymous with no names or other identifiable
information collected other than professional affiliation. There were 13
jurisdictional categories used in the analysis: U.S. federal, Canadian
federal, eight Great Lakes states, Ontario (province), binational orga-
nizations and tribal authorities. Civil servants from all 13 jurisdictions
participated in the survey, with wide variation in the number of gen-
erated responses (Fig. 1[a]). Survey respondents had a diverse range of
years of experiences and professional roles in the transboundary policy
network (Fig. 1[b–c]).
5. Analyses and results
We present our analysis of the survey data in four sequential steps.
First, self-reported communication practices among respondents from
various Great Lakes fishery jurisdictions were quantified and visualized
to illustrate the prevalence and spatial patterns of both informal and
formal communication. The subsequent two steps focus on trust-specific
insights – first validating the trust scale and confirming trust di-
mensionality and then displaying the inter-jurisdictional and multi-di-
mensional trust patterns reported by respondents. The final step brings
the communication and trust components together into a hierarchical
regression analysis to measure their varied and interactive effects on
goal consensus and coordinated decision-making.
5.1. Communication patterns among the Great Lakes jurisdictions
The frequency of formal communication indicated by each re-
spondent (i.e., 2= regularly, 1= occasionally, 0= never) was tallied.
For the 226 civil servants who participated in our survey, a total of
1828 formal communication linkages were reported, 19% greater than
the number of informal communication linkages (1536). When the
linkages were weighted by each reported frequency (1= occasionally;
2= regularly), the occurrence of formal communication over informal
Table 1
Question items that measure four trust dimensions (note the use of the same identifier in Fig. 3).
Identifier Scale items Corresponding trust dimension Key references in developing the
items
ATrust1 Because we have been working with this organization for so long, all kinds of procedures
have become self-evident
Affinitive trust Nooteboom et al., 1997
ATrust2 In our relationship with this organization, informal agreements have the same
significance as formal contracts
ATrust3 Because we have been working with this organization for so long, we can understand
each other well and quickly
PTrust4 In our relationship with this organization, the strongest side is expected not to pursue its
interest at all costs
Procedural trust Nooteboom et al., 1997
PTrust5 In our experiences with this organization, we have never had the feeling of being misled
PTrust6 In our relationship with this organization, both sides are expected not to make demands
that can seriously damage the interests of the other
RTrust7 This organization can be relied upon to perform its objectives Rational trust Dietz and Den Hartog, 2006
RTrust8 In our relationship with this organization, both sides treat each other in a consistent and
predictable manner
RTrust9 Working with this organization can contribute to our agency's success
Non-scale items
DTrust10 You can’t be too careful dealing with people Dispositional trust (not part of the trust
scale)
Smith et al., 2013; Hamm et al.,
2013DTrust11 People are almost always interested only in their own welfare
DTrust12 Most people would try to take advantage of you if they got the chance
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communication increased by 32% (weighted tally of 2571 and 1,944,
respectively), indicating a comparative prevalence of formal commu-
nication in the transboundary fishery policy network.
To help analyze the distribution of communication, both the agen-
cies with which each respondent was affiliated and with which she
communicated were noted and classified according to the jurisdiction
to which the agencies belong. Having included 13 jurisdictions in the
study meant that a 13×13 adjacency matrix was used to create the
inter-jurisdictional communication network (i.e., 13 nodes). The same
process was repeated for informal communication generating a second
adjacency matrix. Fig. 2 presents the network distribution of inter-
jurisdictional communication in the form of density visualization using
VOSviewer 1.6.0 (note: inter-organizational data were grouped as inter-
jurisdictional). Node colour denotes the level of inter-jurisdictional
communication reported for each jurisdiction (i.e., the redder the
colour, the greater number of weighted communication linkages each
jurisdiction is associated with other jurisdictions). The distance be-
tween nodes indicates the intensity of communication, such that closely
located nodes imply a higher frequency of communication between
them, proportionally speaking. As suggested by the node colour, the
patterns for both formal and informal communication reported by re-
spondents highlight a high degree of inter-jurisdictional communica-
tion occurring at the U.S. federal level and in the state of Michigan (e.g.,
803 and 515 reported instances of formal communication linkages,
Fig. 1. Survey information showing (a) number
of completed responses from agencies belonging
to each jurisdiction (dark bars, left y-axis) and
number of times respondents as a whole indicated
communication (formal or informal) with
agencies belonging to each jurisdiction (light
bars, right y-axis) (Note: n=2349; US=U.S.
federal, CA=Canada federal, BI=Binational,
TR= Inter-tribal/indigenous, IL= Illinois, IN
= Indiana, MI=Michigan, MN=Minnesota,
NY=New York, OH=Ohio, ON=Ontario,
PA=Pennsylvania, WI=Wisconsin); (b) re-
spondents’ years of working (n=226); and (c)
their primary roles.
Fig. 2. Density visualization of inter-jurisdictional communicative networks for the Great Lakes fisheries – (a) formal communication; (b) informal communication
(Visualization tool: VOSviewer 1.6.0).
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respectively), followed by the agencies representing Ontario (406) and
Canada federal (369), and binational organizations (349). The cen-
trality of the U.S. federal and Michigan agencies in the reported com-
munication network is represented by their spatially focal position in
relation to other jurisdictions in Fig. 2. For our respondents, it appears
that the binational agencies (e.g., GLFC), U.S. federal and Michigan
appeared to play the role of “hub” or “broker” through which inter-
jurisdictional, inter-agency communication was carried out. By con-
trast, the positions of the Canadian federal and Ontario agencies were
reported to be less central despite their role in managing four of the five
Great Lakes. Interestingly, the overall patterns of communication re-
ported by survey respondents closely mimic the geographical layout of
the region itself, with adjacent jurisdictions shown to communicate
most frequently with each other. The reported patterns of formal and
informal communication, and the importance of these to policy net-
work coordination, were further contextualized by the comments pro-
vided by respondents as part of the survey:
“There is an increased sense of respect and mutual professionalism that
usually increases the communication and the value of each commu-
nication. Informal and formal are both necessary to facilitate my role
here and cooperation with other agencies is essential.” Ontario Ministry
of Natural Resources and Forestry
“Understanding your own mandate and the mandated requirements of
other agencies and their staff makes inter-agency interactions easier and
often allows everyone to get the necessary information/work done in a
more collegial manner.” Environment Canada
5.2. Scale validation establishing trust dimensions
Before analyzing the trust data, it was first necessary to verify, a
priori, the theoretical postulation used to structure our 9-item trust
scale. Structural equational modelling (SEM) was employed, which
takes a confirmatory approach to factor analysis and also allows an
estimation of measurement errors in observed variables. Coinciding
with the number of items, input for the model consisted of a 9× 9
variance-covariance matrix. These relationships were then converted
into structural equations. We ran a structural model estimating both the
loadings and the goodness of fit for the proposed model. To enable
estimation, we constrained one loading of an observed variable for each
latent construct. This means that the loading for the constrained ob-
served item will be 1 and the other items for each latent construct are
free to vary. Covariances between the different trust dimensions were
also estimated. This setup places very few restrictions on the data and
allows for the estimation of the parameters of interest while still being
over-identified. In addition to the standard goodness of fit measures for
the proposed structural equation, Root Mean Squared Error of
Approximation (RMSEA), the Comparative Fit Index (CFI), the Tucker-
Lewis Index (TLI) and Chronbach’s Alpha were calculated to verify
internal consistency.
The results of SEM depicted the linkages among the observed and
latent constructs, graphically represented in Fig. 3. All of the observed
variables loaded significantly on the proposed latent constructs
(p < .05). The covariance between the three trust types is positive and
also significant at the p < .05 level despite being fairly small
(ΦAT,PT= 0.13, ΦAT,RT= 0.21, ΦPT,RT= 0.16) (see Supplementary
material Table S.3 for full SEM results).
While the structural equation model explored a specific structure for
our scale, the Cronbach’s Alpha coefficient provides insight on the
overall scale properties. The resulting coefficient of 0.799 suggests that,
as a single construct, the scale is quite robust. The coefficients for each
dimension of trust (affinitive, procedural and rational) also produced
acceptable numbers: 0.742, 0.634 and 0.687, respectively. We posit
inter-organizational trust as a second-order or macro-level construct of
trust composed of three first-order factors – affinitive, procedural and
rational trust, which are positively and significantly correlated. The
SEM results support this interpretation as the best model.
Next, the results for three practical fit indices, RMSEA, CFI and TLI,
indicate the model’s goodness of fit. As a rule of thumb, given our re-
latively small sample sizes for SEM, we propose that a RMSEA fit
smaller than the cut-off value of 0.10 is acceptable, while
RMSEA < 0.05 would indicate a well-fitting model (Browne and
Cudeck, 1993; see also Hu and Bentler, 1999). We also aver that CFI
and TLI values around 0.95 or higher provide relative assurance that
our model is a good fit for the observed data. This specification of the
model returned reasonably acceptable goodness of fit measures
(CFI= 0.937, RMSEA=0.081, TLI= 0.905), suggesting that the ob-
served variables are satisfactory to use in the structural model and that
the trust scale composed of the proposed sets of three dimensional items
is sufficiently reliable and internally consistent.
5.3. Trust patterns among the Great Lakes jurisdictions
The following procedures were applied to the Likert-scale scores of
the nine trust questions to descriptively assess and display the pre-
valence of the rational, procedural and affinitive trust types among the
responding members of the Great Lakes fisheries policy network. The
trust scores of a respondent for each of his/her target agencies were first
grouped according to the jurisdiction to which the agencies belong.
These jurisdictionally grouped scores were then averaged so that each
respondent had three trust dimension scores assigned to them for each
target jurisdiction. Next, these respondent-specific scores on each target
jurisdiction were categorized by the home jurisdiction of the re-
spondent and averaged. This step produced trust scores to and from
Fig. 3. Structural equation model showing standardized parameter estimates.
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each jurisdiction. These scores were standardized to a -1 to 1 scale, such
that 1 implies all respondents for a particular pair of home and target
jurisdictions “Strongly Agreeing” to trust items (i.e., high trust), while
-1 would imply a unanimous survey response of “Strongly Disagree” to
indicate a lack of trust. In conjunction with the above procedures, the
Friedman test was used to confirm the statistical independence of the
three trust dimensions.
The results of the Friedman test, based on the averaged item scores
of the respondents, showed that the three dimensions of trust belong to
significantly different response groups, reaffirming their conceptual
distinction (Table 2). Fig. 4 summarizes the distribution of trust re-
ported by civil servants among the jurisdictions comprising the Great
Lakes fisheries policy network. Fig. 4(a) reveals an overall positive
pattern of trust in the policy network for all three trust types. Rational
trust was consistently found to be the most prevalent type, while Affi-
nitive trust was the weakest type reported among the groups. Fig. 4(b)
presents disaggregated results in matrix form, revealing one-to-one
trust relations (limited here to the seven jurisdictions that together
accounted for 84% of survey responses, plus the tribal authorities, for
emphasis). Notably, the communication patterns reported with tribal
authorities (TR) exhibited an acute lack of affinitive trust towards the
state and federal agencies in their professional working relationships
(i.e., red and near-red).
5.4. Impact of trust and communication on goal consensus and coordinated
decision-making
5.4.1. Model description
This final and most substantive step of the analysis measures the
predictive effects of trust on the respondent’s communication-mediated
decision-making. More specifically, the two dependent variables were
the degree to which inter-organizational communication – formal and
informal – had led the respondent to make professional decisions they
would not have otherwise made (survey question 2.3 and 2.5 in
Supplementary material Table S.2). A third dependent variable was
targeted at determining which trust variables are most associated with
predicting goal consensus in the network (survey question 3.10). It is
envisaged that trust can reduce uncertainty in collective decision-
making and enable agencies to engage in cooperative behaviors to-
wards shared goals and conflict reduction (Hardy et al., 1998; Gray
et al., 2012) Three distinct hierarchical regression models were con-
structed (one for each dependent variable), namely: (1) impact of in-
formal channel communications with specific target agencies on the
participant’s decision-making; (2) impact of formal channel commu-
nications with specific target agencies on the participant’s decision-
making; and (3) impact on goal consensus with specific target agencies.
To investigate the synergistic effects of trust with formal and in-
formal modes of communication, our models included two-way inter-
action terms. These enabled the analysis to determine whether com-
munication type and trust interact for additive or subtractive effects on
decision-making. Most relevantly, they enabled an unravelling of the
effects of informal communication and trust that are often conflated
(see Isett et al., 2011) to see if they operate as master variables insofar
as they partially determine the effects of other variables in addition to
exhibiting an independent effect. Following the recommendations by
Cohen et al. (2003), a centering technique (i.e., subtracting the mean of
the estimator from each participant’s score) was first applied on vari-
ables involved in the interaction. Then, the resulting centered variables
were multiplied to generate interaction terms. Eight interaction terms
Table 2
Results of the Friedman test for finding differences between trust dimensions
(N=226).
Trust dimension Mean Std. deviation Mean rank Test statistics
Rational trust 2.071 0.4542 1.20 Chi-square 246.3
Procedural trust 2.568 0.5417 2.19 Df 2
Affinitive trust 2.856 0.6108 2.61 p-value 0.000
Fig. 4. (a) Average rating of each trust dimension towards target jurisdictions comprising the Great Lakes fisheries policy network; (b) the degree of the three trust
dimensions dyadically described between the eight most notable “home” jurisdictions (rows) and all 13 “target” jurisdictions (columns). Rating and colour coding are
both based on normalized scores.
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were created for incorporation into hierarchical regression models (see
Table 3).
The survey’s hierarchical design, in which respondents were invited
to score multiple agencies on several questions, introduced a repeated
measures property to the data. Controlling for this in the regression
analysis would have required 225 dummy variables, an untenable
analytical strategy. Instead, we used criterion scaling, an alternative
approach for encoding predictors with a large number of categories
when analyzing data with repeated measures designs (see Pedhazur,
1977; Gibbons and Sherwood, 1985). By using the participreant’s mean
score on the dependent variable as the predictor value for all target
agencies she rated, each individual participant in a single predictor was
effectively identified (for an application of criterion scaling with simi-
larly structured data, see Temby et al., 2017).
For ease of incorporation into analyses and interpretation, both
participant and target agencies were aggregated into six groups: (1)
Binational agencies, (2) Canada Federal agencies, (3) Canada Ontario
agencies, (4) U.S. Federal agencies, (5) U.S. State agencies, and (6)
Inter-Tribal authorities. These aggregated Participant and Target
agency categories were then dummy-coded for use as regression pre-
dictors, in each case using Inter-Tribal authorities as the reference ca-
tegory. This process yielded five dummy-coded predictors for
Participant agencies and five for Target agencies.
Predictor sets were defined and entered into each hierarchical re-
gression model in a pre-determined order using the following general
logic: (1) control variables, (2) independent variables, and (3) inter-
actions, which were entered after all their constituent main effects had
been entered and accounted for. The specific order and rationale for
each predictor set are listed in Table 3.
5.4.2. Model results
Fig. 5 presents a summary of the significant results from the three
hierarchical regression models (see Supplementary material Table S.4
for full model summary tables and predictor-specific coefficients). The
arrowheads point to the dependent variable in each regression model
and the overall R2 associated with each model is shown in bold. The
strength and direction of each relationship is shown by the standardized
regression coefficient attached to each predictor-dependent variable
link; all coefficients shown are significant at p< .01. The order of set
entry is presented down the left side of the figure.
Fig. 5(a) presents the impact of predictor variables on the ability of
informal communication to influence decision-making in the policy
network. After controlling for participant jurisdiction and the criterion
scaled predictor, three independent variables had a significant effect on
inter-agency influence. The frequency of informal communication had a
substantial effect on influence through informal communicative chan-
nels. Rational trust and affinitive trust both displayed significant ef-
fects, with the latter having the largest effect. Procedural trust did not
exhibit an effect. One interaction variable (FI x AT) was found sig-
nificant: with the increase in the frequency of informal communication,
the impact of affinitive trust on decision-making through informal
communication significantly increases. The entire regression model
predicted about 68% of the variability in the impact of informal com-
munication on decision-making.
Fig. 5(b) presents the significant results of the hierarchical regres-
sion analysis predicting the impact of trust and formal and informal
communication on the ability of formal communication to influence the
coordinated decision-making among network members. After control-
ling for participant jurisdiction and the criterion-scaled predictor, five
independent variables had a significant effect on inter-agency influ-
ence. The results were similar to those of the previous model. Higher
frequency of informal communication predicted greater impact of
formal communication on coordinated decision-making. Again, higher
levels of rational trust and affinitive trust were shown to predict a
greater impact of formal communication on coordinated decision-
making, with affinitive trust having a stronger effect. We also observed
an effect of the dependent variable of our prior model (informal com-
municative impact) on the impact of formal communication. Lastly, we
observed a substantial independent effect of formal communication
frequency predicting the impact of formal communication on co-
ordinated decision-making. The interaction effect between the
Fig. 5. Summary of significant hierarchical regression relationships for pre-
dicting impact on (a) informal communication-mediated decision-making (b)
formal communication-mediated decision-making; and (c) goal consensus. The
hierarchical predictor sets are separated by short dotted lines and the change in
R2 associated with the addition of that predictor set to each regression model is
shown in solid-line boxes. Note: N= 226 respondents; n= 2349 Target Agency
ratings; contribution of predictor set shown as ΔR2; path coefficients are stan-
dardized regression coefficients; only significant (p < .01) relationships are
shown.
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frequency of informal communication and affinitive trust (FI x AT) on
inter-agency influence (this time, through formal channels) was once
again confirmed. An interaction between affinitive trust and formal
communication (FF x AT) was also observed. Affinitive trust’s observed
additive effect across both models, independent and synergistic with
informal and formal communication, suggests that it operates as a
master variable in facilitating coordinated decision-making. Notably,
procedural trust was found to interact negatively with the frequency of
informal communication (FI x PT), such that the less informal com-
munication reported among agencies, the greater the impact of proce-
dural trust. The entire regression model predicted about 69% of the
variability.
Fig. 5(c) presents the regression results on the predicting the im-
pacts of trust and communication on goal consensus among agencies.
After controlling for participant jurisdiction, target jurisdiction, and the
criterion scaled predictor, three independent variables and two inter-
action variables had a significant effect on goal consensus. Frequency of
informal communication exhibited a small effect, while formal com-
munication did not. Rational trust had the largest effect on goal con-
sensus among the trust types, followed by procedural trust. Procedural
trust also interacted with communication frequency; as in Model (b), it
displayed a negative interaction with informal communication (FI x PT)
while it displayed a positive interaction with formal communication (FF
x PT). Affinitive trust exhibited no statistically significant effect. The
entire regression model predicted about 66% of the variability.
These findings confirm the importance of both informal commu-
nication and the multiple dimensions of trust in facilitating learning
and adjustment in inter-organizational policy networks. In each ana-
lysis, the frequency of informal communication was found to have a
pronounced effect on coordinated decision-making between agencies
through formal and informal channels. Furthermore, informal com-
municative impact, itself largely determined by informal communica-
tion frequency, substantially influenced decision-making through
formal channels. These findings were also supported by qualitative data
provided by respondents:
“We have found informal and networking (even socializing) with staff
from other agencies to be very important to building trust and familiarity.
I work more closely with some staff from other agencies than I do with
many of the staff from our own agency. The collaboration is one of the
more enjoyable parts of my job but generally it hasn't prevented us from
disagreeing professionally at times. The trust does help afford us oppor-
tunities to work out issues before getting to more formal impasses.”
Michigan Department of Natural Resources
“Good planning, governance etc. is important, but the success of Great
Lakes management has more to do with positive relationships between
agencies. The informal process is key. Without a good relationship the
small issues can result in stalled initiatives.” Ontario Ministry of
Natural Resources and Forestry
The findings also show the relative importance of different types of
trust for collaborative processes. On the one hand, for one member of a
network to influence another (vital for what Agranoff and McGuire,
(2001) call “mutual learning and adaptation”), affinitive trust is crucial.
On the other hand, for achieving goal consensus and conflict reduction
among agencies, procedural trust is a significant contributor while af-
finitive trust does not appear to have a direct effect. Rational trust is
important across both types of collaborative processes examined in this
paper, but most relevant for goal consensus. We found no evidence that
an individual’s propensity to trust others (i.e., dispositional trust) af-
fects the degree to which their inter-agency interactions influence their
self-reported behavior towards coordinated decision-making. Responses
to the open-ended questions in our surveys supported the finding that
the long-term professional relationships leading to affinitive trust are
particularly important for inter-agency collaborative processes:
“Personal relationships are very important and the Great Lakes tends to
attract domain experts who stay with the portfolio for long periods of
time or even their entire career. […] However, there is a large cadre of
people retiring or nearing retirement which will put a big dent in con-
tinuity and potentially trust.” Ontario Ministry of the Environment
and Climate Change
“Struggles with […] losing staff positions and losing program resources.
It is extremely difficult to work with fewer people and with other agencies
that have staff rotating through roles just to get something done. New
contract workers do not have the background they need to perform the
duties. This strains working relationships and reduces the amount of
work that can be accomplished.” Environment Canada
6. Discussion and conclusion
The Great Lakes fisheries policy network offers an instrumental case
where ecosystem-based management has been formally oper-
ationalized, characterized by a long history of agencies working to-
gether across jurisdictional boundaries to tackle inter-connected en-
vironmental and natural resource management issues. Despite some
successes, the capacity of this transboundary policy network to collec-
tively learn, adapt, coordinate and innovate in response to rapid en-
vironmental change across scale is being increasingly questioned
(Henquinet and Dobson, 2006; Krantzberg and Manno, 2010;
McLaughlin and Krantzberg, 2011, 2012), with recent calls to enhance
“transboundary governance capacity” in the Great Lakes (see Great
Lakes Policy Research Network, 2015; Song et al., 2016). The results of
our study shed new light on how such transboundary governance ca-
pacity might be enhanced, revealing the different effects of trust and
mode of communication on coordination across boundaries and pro-
viding a basis for developing more diversified strategies of inter-orga-
nizational interaction within the Great Lakes fisheries policy network.
The findings also have global relevance to governance network praxis,
empirically confirming the multi-dimensionality of trust and commu-
nication in function and form and extending the qualitative work of
Coleman and Stern (2018) by quantifying the impact of trust and
communication on coordinated decision-making and goal consensus, as
reported by network members.
Our results revealed a greater prevalence and influence of rational
trust in the geographically dispersed inter-organizational Great Lakes
policy network (see Fig. 4), which supports existing theory that at the
outset of new or infrequent interactions, or when based on shallower
working relationships, rational trust will be dominant, while longer,
repeated interactions and deeper relations would go on to involve more
affinitive, “identification”-based elements (Dietz and Den Hartog, 2006;
Lewicki et al., 2006; Pirson and Malhotra, 2011). According to Coleman
and Stern (2018), rational trust can similarly help facilitate the re-
cruitment of new people into voluntary collaborative initiatives. The
influence of rational trust on coordinated decision-making and goal
consensus was also not unexpected, with believing that working with a
given organization can contribute to your agency’s success (one of ra-
tional trust’s components) being, to a degree, coterminous with being
influenced by that organization or believing that its goals align with
yours. Our more interesting findings concern the other trust types.
On coordinated decision-making, affinitive trust was found to be the
most important, enhancing the likelihood of both informal and formal
communication to have an impact (see Fig. 5[a–b]). This finding sup-
ports the results of previous research conducted in other transboundary
policy networks (see Temby et al., 2015, 2017), and is noteworthy for
two reasons. First, our measure of coordinated decision-making oper-
ationalizes Agranoff and McGuire’s (2001) concept of mutual learning
and adaptation, the process that provides the impetus for the devel-
opment of networks, and a substantial component of the “groupware”
(Agranoff and McGuire’s term) that facilitates ‘value-adding’ network
outcomes. Second, affinitive trust was the most under-reported in our
survey of civil servants working in the Great Lakes fisheries policy
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network (see Fig. 4), suggesting that there may be institutional barriers
to developing longer-term and more informal working relationships.
Such relationships often require time to develop and money spent on
activities that can appear to have minimal measurable benefit (e.g.,
conference attendance, face-to-face meetings with colleagues located at
great distances, socializing outside of work hours). Affinitive trust is
thus expensive, and the need to develop it arguably runs against the
grain of contemporary public management trends, such as incentivized
early retirement, travel restrictions, staff rotations and turnover and
private contracting.
On goal consensus (or, its obverse, conflict), our data did not show
that affinitive trust had an effect. Yet procedural trust, which had no
observable influence on coordinated decision-making, had a sizeable
effect on shaping mutual goals. These findings illustrate the differential
influence of trust. Affinitive trust is important for enabling agencies in
inter-jurisdictional networks to coordinate decision-making, but pro-
cedural trust helps achieve shared aims and lower conflict. This is in-
tuitive. Because procedural trust is the institution- or system-based trust
one has on the overall system, comprising formal or legalized me-
chanisms such as protocols, professions and licences, confidence to trust
another entity rests on the existence of legitimated structures that
transcend personal characteristics or past history of interaction (see
“institution-based trust” in Zucker, 1986; Shapiro, 1987; Stern and
Coleman, 2015). Our data shows higher levels of procedural trust than
affinitive trust in the policy network (see Fig. 4), likely due to our focus
on surveying civil servants who often share a public service ethos and
associated bureaucratic safeguards against unethical or unprofessional
behavior. Since such safeguards are normatively embedded as legal-
institutional requirements, they can facilitate goal consensus and act as
a ‘backstop’ against procedural distrust and inter-agency conflict.
Results also highlighted the relative prevalence of formal commu-
nication over the informal. Given that this study focused on a public
sector policy network, this is perhaps not a surprising finding. Isett and
Provan (2005) identify that formal contracts and structures play an
important role in carrying out public-sector functions and maintaining
organizational stability, but they also note that formal and informal
interactions are not necessarily mutually exclusive in government.
When taken into account in a single model, the effects of informal and
formal communication frequency on coordinated decision-making were
approximately equal (Fig. 5[b]). Yet only informal communication was
shown to influence goal consensus. These results suggest that, similar to
affinitive trust, there may be opportunities to enhance transboundary
governance capacity in the Great Lakes region through increased in-
formal interaction among policy network members.
According to Stern and Baird (2015), the social interactions af-
forded by trust diversity can help to drive institutional resilience
through functional redundancy. Some of the ways in which the varied
functions of different trust dimensions compensate for a lack/loss of
certain other forms of trust and communication are nicely highlighted
in our survey findings, particularly via the results of the two-way in-
teraction terms used in the hierarchical regression models. Most no-
tably, the finding of procedural trust interacting negatively with the
frequency of informal communication (from both model [b] and [c])
shows that when people communicate less informally, procedural trust
has a larger effect. In other words, procedural trust associated with fair
and transparent processes becomes more important when relationships
are poorly developed, compensating for a lack of inter-personal trust in
maintaining coordination and enabling collaboration. On the contrary,
but still consistent with the theory, procedural trust interacted posi-
tively with the frequency of formal communication (model [c]), sug-
gesting when formal communications are more prevalent, the effect of
procedural trust is synergistic. Such interactive results substantiate the
(empirical) importance of considering and applying the multi-dimen-
sional view of trust and communication in natural resource governance.
That procedural trust was more prevalent than affinitive trust among
the surveyed members of the Great Lakes fisheries policy network
(Fig. 4) further highlights the buffering potential of one type of trust in
the case of a weaker other. On this point, Stern and Baird (2015: 3)
noted, “Individuals can work together with less interpersonal trust if
systems-based [procedural] trust is high.”
Gaining a deeper understanding of the mechanisms that can ‘unlock’
the collaborative functioning of transboundary policy networks remains
an important area for research and policy attention. Insights from this
study add to the growing body of evidence that informal interactions
and relationship-based trust are crucial factors in motivating and fa-
cilitating coordinated decision-making across organizational and jur-
isdictional boundaries. Future research to further test the various di-
mensions of trust and communication together with the concomitant
refinement of psychometric scales to more accurately and consistently
operationalize these concepts is warranted. Ultimately, the nuanced
ways in which networked governance strategies accommodate and
encourage informal communication and trust-building among diverse
network members (including public, private and civic organizations)
may prove to be a breakthrough in realizing the degree of mutual co-
ordinsation required to match the complexity of transboundary natural
resource systems.
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